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Good evening.
Thank you to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs for organising this event, and for your efforts to foster New Zealand’s understanding of international affairs. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak here today.
As keen observers and practitioners of international relations, you will all be aware of the degree to which the global environment has changed, even in the past two years.
We in New Zealand have enjoyed for a long time the benefits of a strategic environment in which we could focus heavily on growing our economy, seeking trading relationships and pursuing our interests safe in the knowledge that the stable post-war, liberal, international rules-based order provided the guardrails.
We believe in that order, and we will act to preserve it. But it is not enough on its own. We rely on our ally, our friends and our partners to help make us more secure, and they rely on us for support. Few countries can go it alone, and we are no exception.
We are no longer in a world – and I would argue that maybe we never were – where prosperity and security are mutually exclusive. There is no economic security without national security.
As Minister of Defence, I am keenly aware that our Defence Force needs to be acknowledged for its core functions. It plays a vital in contributing to national defence and resilience, and helping deliver whole-of government security objectives.
But we have a Defence Force with military capabilities for a reason. We choose to hold at readiness a credible force of highly trained and capable men and women who are prepared and ready to act with force if needed, to defend our country.
Unfortunately 35 years of underinvestment has allowed this capability to deteriorate.
Defence Capability Plan
I was therefore very proud to last month launch with the Prime Minister, the Chief of Defence Force and the Secretary of Defence our new Defence Capability Plan – or, given the military’s fondness for acronyms, the DCP.
This plan sets out $12 billion of planned commitments over the next four years, including $9 billion of new spending, with a path to reaching 2 percent of GDP in the next eight years.
The release of the DCP represents the culmination of several years of focused work by the Defence agencies to ensure our defence policy settings and our defence capability investments best support New Zealand’s interests in a changed and changing world through to 2040.
As you can imagine, the content of the DCP was the subject of some intense discussions with my Cabinet colleagues. We know the critical importance of getting this right, of having a plan that is both appropriately ambitious and achievable, and firmly focused on what is in New Zealand’s best interests.
I am proud of the DCP, and I welcome the very positive reactions to it, both domestically and internationally.
New Zealanders understand that our world has changed, and the highly skilled and professional personnel of the New Zealand Defence Force need to be ready to do what the New Zealand Government and people ask of it, often at short notice.
Defence is not something that can be mothballed until you need it. Because when the chips are down, you need a force that is ready and equipped to do whatever is asked of it – and it needs to be able about to do it immediately.
That means it must be empowered and equipped appropriately.
I have been particularly pleased with the broad support the DCP has received from across Parliament. National security is one area of public policy that benefits strongly from a bipartisan approach, and I welcome the support for a more capable Defence Force.
I have been able to discuss the DCP with a number of my international counterparts, and I can tell you it has been received very positively by New Zealand’s security partners. Our partners have welcomed our updated approach and our intention to invest more in New Zealand’s defence capabilities.
The first step to turning the DCP into action was taken on Sunday, when I announced the Government is putting aside $2 billion plus to replace the Defence Force’s ageing maritime helicopters. Alongside that, we are investing $957 million over four years in Defence Force activities, personnel and estate in Budget 25. I will have more to say on Budget Day on additional defence investment.
The increase in defence investment has generated quite a range of questions about elements of New Zealand’s defence policy, both long-standing and newly introduced, that could usefully be explained in greater detail. And that is what I would like to do this evening.
I will talk in particular to our assessment of New Zealand’s strategic environment, our alliance with Australia, our approach to deterrence, the importance of combat capability, and opportunities for innovation.
New Zealand’s strategic environment
The first line in the first chapter of the DCP sets the scene well for the policy settings that follow: “New Zealand is facing its most challenging and dangerous strategic environment for decades.”
Security challenges that we are familiar with remain with us. At home and in our immediate region these include ongoing risks of natural disasters and maritime security challenges of all kinds. And some of these are becoming worse – for example, we are seeing increasing use of the Pacific as a transhipment route for illegal drugs.
And for our Pacific partners in particular, climate change and its wide-ranging security impacts continue to represent the primary security concern.
Increasingly, however, the defining character of our strategic environment is strategic competition.
Globally, in the wider Indo-Pacific and in our immediate region, we are seeing some states increasingly acting in ways that undermine existing international rules and norms, and seeking to reshape both regional orders and the global order as a whole.
Recent events in our immediate region – including the PRC Task Group operating in the Tasman Sea and last year’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile test – have demonstrated that New Zealand’s geographic location no longer shelters us from threats to the extent that it once did. Our region is of increasing strategic significance, and global challenges and tensions are having direct impacts on our security.
And the wider Indo Pacific contains a number of potential security flashpoints – be that cross-Strait tensions, the Korean Peninsula or competing claims in the South China Sea.
Perhaps the most acute – and still shocking – example of the deteriorating strategic environment is Russia’s ongoing illegal war against Ukraine.
New Zealand remains fully committed to supporting Ukraine’s self-defence and national resilience. The Prime Minister announced last month during his trip to the United Kingdom and Türkiye that New Zealand is extending its military assistance in support of Ukraine’s self-defence through to December 2026.
New Zealand welcomes efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace, and is following the negotiations on a potential ceasefire very closely.
Overview of DCP policy settings
As a government, we need to ensure we are employing our full range of tools of statecraft to best effect in service of New Zealand’s national interests.
We are a small island nation that relies on trade for its economic growth and – as I have previously said, we cannot have economic security without national security.
A compromised supply chain can lead to disruptions, financial losses, reputational damage and compromised products or services. And our supply chains rely on the security of maritime, air, land, space and cyber domains.
As Defence Minister, I need to ensure the Defence Force has the right capabilities, is using those capabilities to support peace and security, and is prepared for scenarios in which competition tips into confrontation and conflict.
That is why the DCP has three new defence policy objectives. These aren’t a radical shift in our policy, but they provide a sharper focus.
The first is to protect and promote New Zealand’s security, and that of our immediate region. New Zealand’s security is indivisible from the strategic situation our region is facing.
Defence plays a key part in ensuring the security, stability, and resilience of our immediate region by deterring actions contrary to the security of New Zealand and our regional partners and helping sustain wider regional conditions favourable to New Zealand’s security interests. An important part of this is delivering our defence and security constitutional responsibilities to the Realm.
Second is enhancing our alliance and other key security partnerships, which I’ll expand on shortly.
And third is to contribute to achieving our global interests, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Defence will continue its pattern of operations in support of maritime security and the existing liberal international rules-based order, and we will work closely with our international security partners to promote collective security approaches in accordance with international law, in particular the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), including freedom of navigation and oversight.
But Defence’s activities are truly global as well, as demonstrated by NZDF’s ongoing support to Ukraine and operations in the Middle East. Just last month, the Royal New Zealand Navy deployed the frigate HMNZS Te Kaha to conduct anti-smuggling operations in the Indian Ocean as part of the New Zealand-led Combined Task Force 150. The taskforce has already had very real impact, disrupting the trade of $600 million worth of illegal drugs so far.
Taken together, these three new objectives set the direction for Defence, as part of an all-of-Government approach, to promote and protect our national interests.
Our Alliance and security partnerships
But I want to expand specifically on our security partnerships. New Zealand has always valued the importance of collective security and supporting international mechanisms that enable collective action and support sovereign equality of states.
This is reflected in the policy settings in the DCP. We have always worked with others that share our values and our interests to shape the world as we would wish it to be, and to prepare together should the worst happen.
Indeed, since becoming the Minister of Defence, I have taken every opportunity to meet with my international defence counterparts, to demonstrate that New Zealand is internationally engaged and willing to step up to respond to new opportunities and emerging threats.
But within that, we will always maintain our independent foreign policy, making our own decisions about what is in New Zealand’s interests – just as other countries do.
It is worth saying more about our relationship with our closest friend and only ally Australia. For this Government, it was essential that the DCP reinforce the importance we place on our alliance with Australia, and the importance in our evolving strategic environment to speak directly about these issues.
I’ve been in touch with my Australian defence counterpart Richard Marles, who is also their Deputy Prime Minister, to offer my congratulations following the weekend’s election. Minister Marles and I both look forward to continuing to work together on a range of issues, including our shared security.
We have specifically referenced the ANZUS Treaty in the DCP, as it continues to underpin the strategic relationship between New Zealand and Australia and formalises the commitments that we have to each other as allies.
It has done so since 1951, and the DCP does not represent any change in its interpretation. And as the Prime Minister stated, our nuclear free policy has not, and will not, change.
We are working to create an increasingly integrated Anzac force, which means we will be better prepared, exercised and equipped to combine our Defence Forces to defend our shared interests. To enhance our interoperability, we have committed to removing tactical, technical and procedural information-sharing barriers where they restrict our ability to operate as an integrated force.
Of course, this Government is also committed to maintaining and investing in a range of other security partnerships, including with our Pacific partners and our Five Eyes partners. As the Prime Minister has indicated, we are also focused on strengthening our relationships across Asia.
Recently, we have signed a number of agreements with partner countries. These include the India-New Zealand Defence Cooperation Arrangement, which is a milestone bilateral arrangement facilitating closer defence relations – including the establishment of regular bilateral defence engagements and opening new areas for collaboration such as deploying and training together.
I was in the Philippines last week to sign a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement, which sets out the legal conditions for military cooperation between our countries.
And as part of the NATO Indo-Pacific 4 grouping, we’re working with NATO and Indo-Pacific partners to uphold the international rules-based order and democratic values that are fundamental to our security and prosperity.
Deterrence and combat capability
We’ve also observed commentary on the much more explicit inclusion of, and focus on, deterrence in the DCP.
Deterrence is a normal part of how states operate and what defence forces do. At its core it is about influencing behaviour, or denying opportunities, by making other actors aware of the risks and consequences of undertaking those unwanted activities. Deterrence can be delivered through various tools. But having a credible and capable military force is a key way states deter activities and behaviours they don’t want.
As the DCP itself points out, deterrence is underpinned by having the necessary tools to act. In that respect the DCP recognises the increasing importance of building greater lethality into the force to be able to achieve deterrent effects.
It’s also important here to be clear on what the purpose of a military is. And I referred earlier to the core functions of a Defence Force.
Of course, modern militaries carry out a range of functions. But with the challenging world we now face, we need to reinforce the primary purpose of the military. There is no opting out from today’s strategic realities.
That is why the DCP signals increased strike capabilities which will increase our ability to use force if needed to protect our interests. This will be achieved through the procurement of new missile systems, which will provide an ability to respond to hostile vessels at a greater range.
Options for this include arming existing air and maritime platforms with missiles, such as the P-8A Poseidon fleet and the Anzac frigates, or options such as land-based strike.
Opportunities for innovation
I’m very aware of the importance of innovation and new technologies in defence.
Experience in Ukraine shows that conventional systems are still needed, but we’ve also seen the use of new technologies in new ways. Tanks and drones in the same battlefield are a reality.
New technologies and innovations will help the NZDF with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities. In the short and medium term, Defence will focus on uncrewed technology, including long-range uncrewed aerial vehicles to provide more persistent maritime surveillance. The DCP also describes uncrewed surface and subsurface vessels to help monitor and protect our Exclusive Economic Zone, and support our Pacific partners.
There will also be a focus on strengthened cyber and information capabilities to protect the NZDF’s networks and systems, and provide defensive cyber, electronic and information warfare effects.
A two-yearly review cycle of this DCP will provide greater flexibility by adopting technologies earlier in their lifecycle, and by incorporating new but proven technologies. Defence is also exploring joint procurement opportunities with Australia, where it makes sense to do so.
A technology accelerator as part of the DCP will enable New Zealand’s high technology sector to quickly develop advanced platforms and systems specifically focused on New Zealand defence problems, and the ability to deliver these rapidly. It would help transition technology from the prototype phase to ‘service ready’ capabilities that could be readily acquired by the NZDF, albeit at limited scale.
We have an opportunity to partner in a better way with industry, and particularly New Zealand industry. How we intend to do this will be set out in a Defence Industry Strategy that will support implementation of the DCP.
One area we see innovation and scope to adapt is in the space industry. As you may know, I am also the Minister for Space.
I believe that here we have an opportunity to harness the incredible innovation across the New Zealand space industry to make contributions across all applications of space.
The world’s reliance on space technologies means that irresponsible behaviour in space has global impacts, and New Zealand has no protection from those effects.
Guaranteeing access to satellite communications and other systems that rely on space is critical to a range of new and existing technologies and systems used by the NZDF.
Part of supporting that access is ensuring we take broader action to support New Zealand’s interest in the safe, secure and responsible use of space. We are developing a new regulatory regime to ensure that operators of ground-based space infrastructure register their operations to deter foreign interference in New Zealand’s space infrastructure.
With partners and allies, New Zealand’s Defence agencies and our innovative space industry can contribute to international efforts to preserve and protect freedom of access to space and all the space-based services we need to prosper.
Closing remarks
I believe this DCP represents change. It is a change to a more deliberate defence policy and is a significant change in the level of investment in our defence.
It is a message to New Zealanders that we are prepared to invest in their security. It is a message to our partners and ally that we will contribute what we need to. And it is a message to the NZDF that we believe in them and what they do.
Change can be hard, and deciding to invest this amount of funding was difficult. We did not, and won’t ever, take that decision lightly.